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THE MULTIPLICITY AND INDIVIDUALITY '
OF INTELLECTS: A RE-EXAMINATION·
OF ST. THOMAS' REACTION TO AVERROES*
SuMMARIUM. Sicut demonstrat S. Thomas, non constat Averrois interpretatio " separabilitatis " intellectus possibilis cum principiis Aristotelis. Solutio autem aristotelico-thomistica,
quod intellectus possibilis multiplicatur secundum multiplicationem substantiae ipsius animae,
inducit ad quaestiones de obiectivitate et de communicatione; qu'arum ·solutio fadlior forte
rtdderetur per quandam hypotbesim intellectus communis in sensu non-averroistico.

The question of whether all men share the same intellect, or, on the contrary, all have their own individual intellects, is a problem which reached its zenith in the middle ages, but still has its modern counterparts, e.g. in that idealism
which couches everything in terms of an absolute knowing ego, as opposed to
that empiricism which reduces knowledge itself to sense impressions and particular concrete images constructed mystically, God knows how, into fodder for
· intelligent speech. This problem, in ·whatever dress it may appear, is not merely psychological or ontological in nature, but has overtones and ramifications
in the epistemological sphere. For it is through the intellect that we purport to
attain knowledge, and truth. And the answer that m~n give to the question,
"what is truth? " will be essentially dependent on their attitude towards the
intellect itself - on whether they consider "intellect" to be an intrinsic element
in human individuality, or something mysteriously out of its reach.
.
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If .there are as many intellects as there are men, and if each man has a
peculiar ontological status or position which cannot be duplicated - then the
community of men wou1d seem to be like a group of artists. sitting in a studio
at different positions: Even if they are trying to reproduce the same, identical
model, the reproductions are bound to .cliffer according to the difference of their
vantage points. In this case, which one of the reproductions could we call ·
" true "? Would not each one of them, in so far as it produces any feature or
facet of the model, be " true", as long as it is valid? In this case, truth would
seem to be purely subjective, and the criterion of truth in the community ·
would seem to be the mere subjective judgement by one man as to whether
another man's view jibes with his own.
If, on the other hand, there were one intellect for all men, then truth would
seem to be like the privileged position of a radio sports announcer: As he calls
the plays in the sporting event or game that is going on befor~ him, he no doubt
excites an indefinitely varied number of combinations of phantasms and impres- ·
sions in the minds of his radio audience. But those in the radio ,audience who
are dependent upon the sportscaster for information, do not see what is taking
place. If there is any truth in the impressions of this audience, it must be essentially dependent on the primary and immediate view of the sportscaster. Therefore "truth" would have to reside essentially with him. Truth would be separate. All other truths would stand or fall precisely to the extent that they
participate in, that they in some way reproduce, this one individual truth. Truth
would be purely objective for .the whole human audience - in the sense that it is
purely separate in their regard.
The human soul, Aristotle tells us, 1 is like an '' instniment of instruments " ,
i.e., a primary means which is in some way directed towards our use of some
other means, some other instrument. And this" instrumentalitv ." would seem to
apply particularly, to the intellective functions of the soul (whether these be from
within or without) - since, as Aristotle· says, 2 all natural things and functions
are teleologically ordered to form; and since, just as in vegetative things their
proper formality lies in their life (vivere viventibus est esse 3 ), so also, in beings
· with intelligence, their proper formality would lie in their thought, their intelligere.
· Granted then that the intellect is in some way the primary and most important instrument of man, our view of the nature of the intellect will in some
way affect our view of its instrumentality, and consequently, also our use of it as
an instrument:
.
Those who would conceive the intellect as something completely individual,
and autonomous, and spontaneous - would seem to a·t tribute to man's intellect
a true efficient causality, an instrumentality which is determining, rather than
determined. The intellect would be, in such a case, like the file which is used
to sharpen the saw. Just as the effectiveness of the saw, in this case, would hin~e
on the determination of " acuity" which it received £tom the file: so also, the
intelligibility or meaningfulness of ideas would be directly proportional. to the
1
2

3

De Anima, HI, 8.
Ibid., LI, 3, 415 b, 15 ff.
Cf. Ibid., II, 4, 415 b, 13.
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character of " universality " with which they are actively imbued by the intellect.
(In modern philosophy, .Kant seems to exemplify such a view).
Those, however, who would conceive the intellect as something outside of,
arid separate from, individual men - would seem to relegate to man's intellect
kind of passive. i. e. receptive, instrumentality - somethi_ng more in the genus ·
of ma·terial causality than efficient causality, Tha_t is, it would not be an instrument in the primary sense of that word, but an instrument in the sense that
a receptacle is an instrument. The individual _human intellect, on this latter
view, would be a tabula ·,asa in the narrowest sense of that expression. All
· spontaneity and activity would come from outside the individual man. Likewise,
intellectual illumination would be something completely extrinsic, which would
be needed to render the confused and disordered phantasms of man universalized
and intelligible. Here we would have the case of a man not actively "mllking"
his ideas, but rather standing in relation to them as purely potential to, or
receptive of, them: "being made" by them, rather than making them. (Berkeley and Spinoza seem to exemplify such a view, in so far as they reduced
thought directly to the agency of God).
Insofar as the intellect is conceived as individual and active, we salvage
subjectivity and freedom, but we raise problems about the possibility of communication; insofar as we conceive the intellect to be separate from individual men,
we salvage the objectivity of truth and perhaps the possibility of communication
- but we sacrifice the independence of individual subjectivities. When the
former position is carried to an extreme, one finds himself at least in the vicinity
of the "egocentric dilemma". If, on the other hand, the latter position were
overemphasized ( not many currents in contemporary Western philosophy find
this position attractive), the result would be a submerging of individual subjec~ivities in some massive universal ego - or a reasonable facsimile. We will elaborate further on the implications of these two extremes in the conclusion to tis
paper. But suffice it to say for the present that the doctrine on the intellect .
which was developed by Thomas Aquinas represented at least" an instinctive
reaction against both these extremes. In other words, his efforts were oriented
towards salvaging both maximal ,spontaneity and maximal receptivity for the
human intellect.
·
·
It will be purpose of this paper. a) to show how Thomas Aquinas, following
Aristotle, reacted against the latter extre~ mentioned above ( as represented by
the position of Averroes), and tried to restore a reciprocity between the two
opposite aspects of intellect within man; and b) · to evaluate the significance of
this " restoration " .
·
·
As a preliminary to this examination, to better place it in its proper frame of
reference; we shall first give a summary of t.he general doctrine of Aristotle on
the nature and functions of the soul, as presented in his De Anima; then we shall
cite what seems to be explicit and unambiguous in Aristotle's doctrine as to the
nature of the intelligence, or the intellective part of the soul.
After this we shall proceed to Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine;
and Thomas Aquinas' refutation of Averroes and counter-interpretation. Finally,
we shall consider the implications of this counter-interpretation_.

a
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1.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DocTRINE ON THE

SouL

IN THE " DE .ANIMA ".

In De Anima II, 3, 4 Aristotle states that it is possible to formulate a common
definition of the soul, a definition which applies communally and without exception to all the different kinds of soul. Such a definition would be like the definition of a " figure ,, which would apply equally to all the different kinds of
figures, without specifying any one of the different kinds. If we define a figure
as a" point drawn out", extended, to de-scribe any kind of a sensible shape" this would not give us an imaginary picture of. a triangle, or a circle, or a pentagon. But it would, of itself, give us an idea of the essential constituents common to all these particular types of figures.
The communal definition of the soul, which applies equally to the- so~ of
a tree and the soul of a man, is " the first act of a natural organic body ". 5 The
soul is that ultimate principle of unity which holds all of a diversity of ·organic
parts together, 6 and causes them to work together for a common end. 7 -And the
composite which is thus unified by the soul has a dual aspect: 1) In so far as
it is organic, and . corporeal (which, in Aristotle's terminology, is the same as
being "potential") - it must be subject to all kinds of motions, or physical
stimuli, impinging on it from sources in the physical environment in which it
finds itself. In so far as it has a unity which goes beyond the mere mathematical
unity of an inorganic continuum, and consequently an activity which is somehow
superior to the purely passive and transient motions transmitted through the
various elemental physical parts, - it is characterized by activities, the intangible
spontaneity of life: thus it is a self-mover, a self-changer 8• Therefore the
body, the material part, of the living thing, is always ·found to be complex,
consisting from a variety of material parts, of corporeal receptivitie~. The first
act, or substantial form, of the living thing, is found, on the other hand, to always have some kind of spontaneity, of self-motion. Complexity of passivities
and internal determination of activities is the common thread which runs through
all the hierarchy of living things.
In plants the passivity takes the form of the reception of elements from
the outside, through the soil, etc.; while the spontaneous activity takes the form
·initially of the new entit~tive and dimensive unity. which is given to these elements, and ultimately of the creation of new and similar organisms through the
process of reproduction, by which natural things are enabled to imitate the eternity of the divine nature. 9 In animals, in addition to these vegetative functions ,
4

414 b, 23.
De Anima, II, 1, 412 b, 5: lvr:eUzeta 17 7C(!WTTJ <Jwµa-ro~ rpvao,ov 6(!Yav,,eofi.
It should be noted that this does not imply that the soul is some special type of substantial
form which is not united to prime matter. Rather, the implication is that the soul is that ·
particular type of form which, when united to Prime Matter, causes a "unity in diversity";
i. e., is characterized by a variety of organs, of specialized instrumental faculties, all working
in harmony for some end superior to any particular organ or the purely quantitative unity
formed by the interconnected organs.
• Ibid., I, 5, 411 b, 9 ff.
1
Ibid., II, 4, 415 b, 15-18.
• Ibid., II, 4, 415 b, 22-24.
' Ibid., II, 4, 415 a, 23-30.
5
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there is -the higher passitivity of the five senses, which are able to receive the various corporeal -forms without their matter, like the wax receives the impression
of a signet ring; 10 of the common sense, which merges these quintuple forms into
the-unity of a single impression; 11 and of the imagination, which ." retains these lat- .
ter impressions in a more or less permanent way, through some organic repertoire,
from which latent images may be re-explicated, at any time in the future, to cause
re-activation of the body. 12 All such passively received sense impressions are
like the various forms of fue which are necessary to ignite combustible objects. 13
There is also, in animals, the higher spontaneity of locomotion, by which they
are enabled to vary and re-shape the part~ of their body among themselves to a
certain extent, and to move them as a whole from place to place, under impetus
of sense appetite, to acquire concrete goods, or escape from concrete evils. 14
Finally, in man, in addition to all the aforementioned, cliere is a higher _passivity, a higher spontaneity, for man not only receives concrete forms without
matter; he can apprehend them as universals. 15 And man not only initiates the
higher intensities of locomotion, but also the activities of thought and volition,
which have an immanent unity which seems not only to rise above the physical
unity of the parts, but also to complietely supercede these fatter, and be carried
bn in an essentially autonomous way. 16
The composite man is, therefore, the epitome of living organisms, in that he
is not limited in potency, but is potential even to the separable forms of material
things; 17 and has activities which not only rise above the multiple teleologies of
the individual physical parts, but are in some way separable from these latter. 18

2.

ARISTOTLE'S FUNDAMENTAL DoCTRINE ON INTELLECT AND INTELLIGENCE.

Perhaps one · of the most practic;able ways to arrive at an understanding of
the " moot points " in Aristotle's doctrine on the intellect - is . to make a pre-·
liminary perusal of the text, to discover that which is explicit, and stated in
relatively unambiguous terms:
In sensation, the various sensible forms of signate ·matter are separated from
their material constrictions 19 and are given that actual existence which their previous material conditions had prevented . them from having. 20 In intelligence,
which in capacity is directly proportional to the perceptivity of the senses ( the
10

II, 12, init.
UI, 2, 427 a, 10-14.
12
III, 3, 427 b, 15-20; 429 a, 4, 5.
13
II, 5, 417 a, 7-9.
1
•
III, 9, 432 b, 15-18.
15
JI, 5, 417 b, 23-25. The mind is not purely passive in regard to the" reception"
of universals, but only • quoad objectum ", i. e., in so far as it depends on concrete phantasms
as conditions for the " making " of universals, and can accomplish this " lhaking •• only in a
11

I bid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid. ,

temporally successive process.
16
11

II
1
'
20

a. ibid., l, 1, 403 a, 6 ff; II,
a . ibid., III, 4, 429 b, 21 ff.
Ibid.
Ibid. , III, 12.
I bid., III, 2, 426 a, 20 ff.

1, 413 a, 14 ff; III, 4, 429 b, 3 ff.

..
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sign .of which is the sensitivity of touch 21 ), these forms are further separated from
their signate and concrete shapes; that is to say, the essence, or intelligibility, of
these forms is separated. This essence, in so far as it has been freed from all particularity, can be called the "form of universality", or a· "universal". These
forms of universality become fully actualized qua forms 22 only in the soul, and
come to have an independent and autonomous existence within the soul - constituting the latter in its specific perfection. 23 The soul, then, in so far as it is
actual, and actively cognizant, becomes the" form of forms", 24 i. e., gives the ultimate formality, or actuality, of intelligibility to sensata, and hence to sensibles.
The human soul, in that it is thus able to ·-give essential, intelligible, purely
intentional formality to all material objects, is analogous to prime matter, which
is all things, in potentia. As Aristotle says, 25
Mind is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkabie, though actually it is nothing
until it has thought.
.

.

The human soul, then, and specifically the mind, has some kind of potentiality. This would ordinarily imply, in the Aristotelian context, that it has some
kind of contrariety. 26 But what kind of contrariety could exist in the soul?
There could certainly not be contrariety in the sense that one intelligible form
could be a real terminus characterized by a definite lack of another form, as
" black " is characterized by the absen~e of white. Aristotle answers this question
in II De Anima, Ch. 5, n where he says that in knowledge, the passage from
potency to act differs from the usual mode of such transition, in that there is
no real privation at the " terminus" of potency. Rather, in the case of knowledge, there obtains
the development of an existent quality from potentiality in the direction of fixity or
nature. 28
·

And so, "potency" seems to be used in a different, or an accomodated
sense, when applied to the_intellect; perhaps in the same way - and for the
. same reason - that, in the Physics, 29 the term " contrariety" is used in the
wide sense in regard to all changes, but is reserved in the most proper way to
· non-substantial changes. 30
21
.
Ibid., II, 9, 421 a, 20 ff: This sensitivity of touch would ·seem to be a merely negative .sign of intelligence; i. e., the lack of it ·would imply lack of intelligence, but its pre·
~ence would not imply acts or habits of exceptional intelligence.
22
But not qua universals: tihis requires an additional act of the .soul.
23
De Anima, II, 5.
24
Ibid., LIi, 8, 432 a, 1-2.
·
25
.
Ibid., III, 4, 429 b, 30-31. Afl quotations from Aristotile here are from the McKeon
edition of the De Anima, unless otherwise noted.
26
Cf. e. g. De Anima, Ill, 6, 430 b, 24-25.
27
417 b, 22 ff.
''
28
417 b, 16: ST. THOMAS, in II De Anima, L. XI, n. 369, says that the "transition " involved in knowledge is unique, in that new positive formalities arc acquired without privations being involved in any way.
29
a. Physics, I, 9, 192 a, 17 ff, where Aristotle says that a "contrary" is a principle
in all natural changes; but qualifies this, e.g. in V, 3, 227 a, 7 ff, where he says that there
are no contraries involved strictly speaking in substantial changes, but rather "opposites ".
30
" Potency" in Aristotle is generally synonymous with " corporeality" (cf. for example
Physics, VIII, 5, 258 a, 21 ff, where t1he potency in a self-mover is made synonymous with
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The proper place, then, of universals, is the human soul. And these universal
forms, after having been actualized in, and by, the soul, do not just pass on,
never to be repeated, as do the transient activities which obtain in the .sphere
of strict corporeal contrariety. They remain in the soul, and cari be reactivated
spontaneously and autonomously by the soul, even in lieu of any corresponding
sensory stimuli. 31 That is to say, they rem:ain in the soul in habitu, in a state
midway between potency and act.
The question naturally -arises - if the soul, qua form and act, cannot have
.any corporeality mixed into it, 32 and is completely distinct from the order and
progression which it causes, 33 and is in itself (per se) sundered from all ·hint of
motion and change 34 - how can we explain the potentiality which seems to be
found in the human soul. With the animal soul, there does not seem to be any
problem. The active potencies of the vegetative parts, and the purely passive
potencies of the sensory parts, do not reside in the soul ·as a subject ( even
imagination involves " motion " in the strict sense of the word, and is essentially
connected with sensation 35 ); their actuation is due to the efficiency of the soul,
but they have their " termini of contrariety " in the disposition of the body. In
the human soul, however, the potentiality for thought seems in some way to
reside in the soul, as is indicated by the fact that the soul can initiate thought
in an independent way, so that it .does not even seem to be moved per accidens,
as regards the thought activities themselves. What kind of potency is involved
here?
· Perhaps it was an awareness of this problem that moved Aristotle, in the
beginning of the
Anima, 36 to pose the question as to whether there might
be a plurality of souls in man. If there is not such a plurality of souls, there
certainly seems to be a plurality of parts . in the human soul qua intellective,
a duality of active and passive parts. This basic duality is thus delineated by
Aristotle: 37 ·
·
.

De

Mind in the ipassive sense is such because it becomes all things·, but mind has
another aspect in that it makes all things;. this is a kind of positive state like light.
" Mind in the passive sense ", i. e., the intellect in · so far as it is all (intelligible) forms in potency, is essentially. changeable, and as such, destructible. At
the death of the individual man, mind qu.a capable of change will pass away:
When mind is set free from its ·present conditions .... we do not .... remember its
former activity because.... mind as passible is destructible. 38
corporeality [continuous substance]). The question as to whether " potency" in the cas~ of
the soul is also to be taken as implying some kind of connected corporeal transition - seems
to be the crux of the problem as to how Aristotle's distinction between the activ.e and passive
aspects of the intellective soul is to be interpreted.
11
Cf. De Anima, II, 5, 417 b, 23 ff.
» Cf. ibid., I, 5, 409 b, 3.
33
Ibid., I, 4, 407 b, 32.
34
Ibid., I , 3, 405 b, 32.
35
Ibid., III, 3, 428 b, 10 ff.
36
Ibid., I, 402 b, 9-10.
37
Ibid., III, 5, 430 a, 14 (Loeb. Ed.).
31
Ibid., III, 5, 430 a, 23-25.
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. The "destructibility" here seems to refer not only to the overt operations
of art ,a nd prudence which are done under the direction of mind, but even to
what we would call essentially intellective activities:
Thinking, loving, and hating are affections not of mind, but of .that which has
mind, so far as it has it. 39
·

Taking

a clue from thls passage, we might even hazard to say that thought

activities - · the formation and comparison of ideas - in so far as their transi-·
tions ,are measurable, do not even reside in . the mind. Rather, they properly
reside in "that which has mind," i.e., the human soul in its corporeal,
transient functions.
And so, in the human soul, there is a basic· duality between the inferior,
passive parts of the soul, which are subject to various kinds of transition; and
the superior, immovable part, which causes the transitions of thought, but
itself is impervious to any transitions; namely, mind, which Aristotle denotes
as " that whereby the soul thinks and judges ". ,4()
The passive part of the human soul, then, is subject to another part, which
is fully actual, absolutely unchangeable, which is a "sort of positive state like
light ". 41 And just as there must be actual light before illumination, so also
there must be actual knowledge before knowing, in rerum natura:
Aotual knowledge is prior in the universe as a whole, not only in nature, bttt in
time. 42
·
.
Aristotle seems to be referring to this state of " actual knowledge " in the
Physics, 43 where he says that the state of knowledge is to all appearances lj.ke
a state of rest, in which phantasms are automatically illuminated, universalized,
as soon as there exists a proper equipoise of bodily functions, and a proper order
among the phantasms themselves. Knowledge is a state of constant actuality,
.which goes into effect ~pontaneously, if impediments and obstructions are
removed. 44
It is mind in this sense that Aristotle seems to be speaking of when he says
that there appears to be some
independent substance implanted within the soul and .... incapable of being destroyed;
- and concludes that
In old age the· activity of mind or intellectual apprehension declines only through
the decay of some other inward part; mind itself is impassible. 4s
39

40

Ibid., I, 4, 408 b, 18 ff.

Ibid., IU, 4, 429 :i, 24 : Whether the potential part of the soul receives some kind
of pe1!pCtUal and stable perfection· as a result of the seemingly passive change to which it is
subject, will be considered later.
·
41
Ibid., LII, ,, 430 a, 16.
u Ibid., III, 7, 431 a, 14 (Loeb. Ed.).
3
•
Physics, VU, 3, 247 b, 1 ff.
44
Ibid., VUI, 4, 255 b, 1.,, 22-23.
45
De A.nima, I, 4, 408 b, 181£: In applying " Mind ,, in these passages to the agent
intellect and to the habitus of actual knowledge which is concomitant to it, I do not mean
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Whether this active in~~ence, comprising intellective light and actuated
knowledge, is truly an "independent substance" or is merely the highest part
of the soul ( the specific perfection of Jthe soul on which hinge all the various
other aspects of its existence) - does not seem to be explicitly-considered by
Aristotle. Is this active intelligence a « higher soul" distinct from the lower
part of the soul, in the same way that an animal soul is distinct from its body;
or is it some way separable like figure and quantity are separable from matter
by the geometrician; or is it unequivocally " separate ", so that we have a
repetition of the Platonic ·cc imprisoned soul ", which merely uses its organic
shell as a horseman rides his steed?
.
Aristotle seems to indicate that the active intelligence is in son;ie way our
true self, and is in some ·way separable from matter, when he says that in the
future life "we do not.... remember mind's former activity.... ". 46 Most likely
the reason Aristotle does not go so far as to say that the active· intelligence is ·actu
separate from matter, is because we do not have any connatural, objective
knowledge of separate ·substances. For, in Aristotle's view, we cannot posit
any higher type of in.depende11ce for the mind, than we can for the objects of
the mind:
· As objects are separable from their matter, so also are the corresponding faculties
of the mind. 47
·

..

- If _w e could have direct apprehension of separ,ate substances, this would
seem to be a sure indication, according to this last-mentioned principle, that
there is some kind of a multiplicity of souls or substances contributing to what
we call "man". However, since we can have no such direct apprehension, especially in)the hierarchically constructed Aristotelian universe - the discussion
would .seem, at face value, to be closed at this point.
.
However, Averroes, ,as we shall ~ee, did .riot consider it to be thus "clos-

ed" ....
3.

AVERROES' HYPOTHESIS: A COMPLETELY SEPARATE INTELLECT.

Averroes, unlike his philosophical predecessor, Avicenna, who posited an
individual speculative intellect which,· though dependent for illumination on
God (pure act), was independent and separable in its own right 48 - interpreted
the intellect qua separable as referring to a separate substance outside of man,
outside of the human soul. The separable, and indeed separate, intellect is,
according to Averroes, the separate intelligence posited by Aristotle 49 as ·the
mover of the sphere of the moon. This separate intelligence is the one " agent
intellect " which illumines all mankind. As illuminating the imagination (" pasto distinguish this from the possible inte11ect, but rather from the passive intellect. Whether
ar not there is a possible intellect also separable from matter is one of the questions we will
consider in this paper.
.. Ibid., III, 5, 430 a, 24.
~ Ibid., III, 4, 429 b, 22-23.
41
a . GILSON, Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 197-205.
• Metaph., XII, 8.
11. -
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sive intellect") of men, and thus undergoing transitions throughout the eternal
generations of men - ·it becomes_the" material intellect" (possible intellect). 50
The material intellect is, according to Averroes, the form (prima perfectio)
of man, resulting from the very reception of the intelligible species in the
passive intellect. 51 Quoad nos, the material intellect is identifiable as the primary subject of the intelligible species, i. e., the temporary phenomenal unity
and entitative formality which is caused in the rational animal by the very
reception of these intentiqnes intellectae: and which effectually differentiates
man from the other animals. 52 •
This " entity ", as the bridge between · the agent intellect and matter, is
the cause of ·the abstraction of forms from matter. It is not passive and corruptible in the sense that purely material forms (subject to constriction, contrariety, tllansmutability, etc.,) are. Rather, this primary sub;ect, · as well as
the secondary subject, i. e., the particular phantasms which are_ illumined
- which together constitute the integral and existent material rationality - are
corruptible secundum quid. That is to say, they are corruptible in so far as
this or that individual man dies. But -they are in toto incorruptible, in the
sense that they will be continued on by successive coadaptations of the agent
intellect with individual imaginations, throughout . the perpetual generations of
men. Also, in the wide sense, they are incorruptible in se, precisely in so
far as that which constitues their ultimate formality and actuality - i. e., the
intelligible intentions, which cause the universalization of the subjective rational
dispositions - are merely extensions of the power of the efficient (agent )
intellect, and thus share in the essential incorruptibility of the latter. 53
In commenting on the passage in III De Anima; 5, where Aristotle differentiates the active from the passive aspects of intellect, Averroes, ·in consonance with the general tenor of his doctrine, as we have just· outlined it, writes
as follows:
It was necessary to attribute these two actions, i.e. the reception of thought and
the making of thought, to the soul which is in us, even though the real agent and
recipient are eternal substances. And the reason for this is that these two actions i. c., the abstraction of intelligibles and the understanding of them - are reducible
in the last analysis to our own spontaneity. For " to abstract " means nothing more
than to reduce the imaginative intentions in the ·mind to act, after they have been
in potency. And" to understand" means nothing more than to receive such intentions.
And since we experience the selfsame thing, ii.e., ·t he imaginative intentions, to be
transferred in being frosn one order to the other, we naturally say that there must
be ,a n agent and recipient as causes of this. On this token, then, the recipient is
matei,ial, whlle the agent is efficient. 54
50
51

52

GILSON, op. cit., pp. 224, 225.
AVEUOES, In Ill De Anima,

V, 37~394.

,,

Ibid., IV, 1-47.

In Ill De Anima, V, 549-604.
.
Ibid., XVIII, lines 72-82: "Fuit ncccssc attribucre has duas
animc in nobis,
scilicct recipere intcllectum et facere cum, quamvis agens et recipiens sint substantie eterne,
propter hoc quia hae due actioncs reductc sunt ad nostram voluntatem, scilicet abstrahere
i n ~ et intclligcre ca. Abstrahcrc enim nichil est aliud quam faccrc intcntioncs ymaginatas intcllectas in actu postquam crant in potentia; intelligcrc autcm nichil aliud est quam
rccipctt has intentioncs. Cum cnun invcnimus idem ttansfcrri in suo cssc de ordinc in ordi·
" AVEUOES,

54

actiones
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It may be surmised from this that, in Averroes' estimation, the distinction
by Aristotle of. the intellect into its " own " active and passive aspects, is just
a _phenomenal description, an accomodation to our human way of perceiving
things. Nor does Averroes find any difficulty from the ·subsequent statement .
of Ai:istotle that, in the separated state, ~' we do not.... remember mind's former
activity".~ For, in Averroes' formulation, "we", i.e., the human supposita,
are nothing but. transient manifestations of the power of the separate intelligence. And thus, in commenting on this passage, Averroes does not retain
the . " we ", but seems to feel justified in confining the discussion to " our
thoughts ":
· The interpretation of this passage contains the answer to the question which
caused the ancient commentators to believe that the intellect in habitu is eternal,
and caused Alexander to suppose that the material intellect was itself generable and
corruptible: namely, the question, « how is it that our thoughts · are not eternal, while
the intellect, and its recipient, is eternal? » And Aristotle seems to answer ·us, saying
that the material intellect understands nothing without the passive intellect, in spite
of the fact that it is itself the agent and tedpient; just as there can be no percepti9n
of color without some colored thing - in spite of the fact that there is light and the
power of sight. 56

Averroes ·seems to be saying, in effect, that " we do not remember " in
this future state, simply because we are not there; and we are not there, simply
because our constituent · thoughts are not there. For, even on the basis of
experience alone, who would say that the thoughts which succeed one another
in our mind in a-constant train are - any of them - eternal? Our thoughts are
the result, proximately, of our ephemeral passive intellect, which merely contributes its moments to the material intellect " obtaining " ipso facto from the
continuation of .separate agent intellect and human imaginations.
With great argumentative skill, Averroes thus justifies his theory of a.
completely separate intelligence. It remains to be seen whether this theory
is in concord with the whole context of Aristotle's doctrine on the soul.
4.

ST.

THOMAS' REFUTATION OF . AVERROES.

Averroes, as we have seen, posited o"ne· intellect for all men: an intellect
which in itself was completely actual and active - an agent intelligen~; but
through its diffusive power, through its ~wer of activating the cc first and
nem, scilicet intentionC6 ymaginatas, diximus quod · neccsse est ut hoc sit a causa agenti et
rccipienti. Recipiens igitur est materialis, ct agcns est efficiens ".
.

55
AnsTOTLE, De Anima, HI, ,, 24.
" AVEnoEs, In .JII De Anima, XX, Lines 230-240: Erit sermo in quo dixit: "Et non
remcmoramur, etc.", &.olutio qucstionis que fccit antiquos expositorcs credcrc in~cctum
qui est in lubitu essc ctcmum, et ifecit Alexandrum opinarc intellectum matcrialem essc gencnbilem et corruptibilem, in qua diccbatur: Quomodo intellecta a nobis sunt non cterna, cum
hoc quod intcllectus est ctemus et recipiens est eternum? Et quasi elicit respondendo quod
c:ausa in hoc est quia intellcctus materialis nicbil intelligit sine intellectu passibili, 1kct ageos
lit ct rccipicns sit, sicut comprcbendcre colorem non est, licct lux sit ct visus sit, nisi c::oloratum sit.
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second· subjects" with which the eternal generations of men supplied it " became " the eternally-progressing material intellect.
If Averroes had only posited a separate agent intellect, he would no doubt
have been in store for more lenient treatment at the ·hands of the Angelic
Doctor. For, as St. Thomas himself ·avers,
No intolerable conclusions would seem to follow, if multitudes were perfected by
one agent, after the manner that all the visual faculties of animals are brought to the
perfection of sight by a single sun. 57

After all, in the str.ict sense, there is one separate agent intellect for all
men - and this is God Himself, Who illumines all intellectual creatures. 58 And
to say there is one agent intellect for all men would neither uproot the
foundations of Christian belief, nor do much violence to the context" of Aristotle: It would leave Christian faith and morals relatively undisturbed, because
the possible intellect would still be saddled with responsibility in these areas
- albeit a responsibility conceived in a. more passive manner. And i't would
also seem to do nothing more to Aristotle than imbue him with a Platonistic
tinge - which would certainly represent no unprecedented anomaly in the annals
of the interpreters of Aristotle. 59
However, Averroes posited not only a separate agent intellect, but also a
separate "material" intellect, as we have seen. Such a separate material
intellect (which St. Thomas makes synonymous with the "possible" intellect)
would give rise to innumerable difficulties: As a separate substance, removed
from all the transience of matter, it would itself be always understanding actu.
How, then, could we explain the separate intellections of diverse men? Individual men could not he moved by one possible intellect as a motor, because
this would destroy their personal resJ?Onsibility and free will, and ·consequendy
also the grounds for moral philosophy. · Nor could intelligere actu be a mere
transient action, passing through men, for by definition it is the immanent
action properly attributable only to the separate possible intellect; and indeed,
· as a received action, it would be a passion, an intelligi rather than an intelligere: it would only cause men to be understood in a passing manner - but
not to have their own individual intellections. Nor, finally, would it do to

57

De unitate intellectus contra Ave"oistas, 01. VI, p. 32 (Mandonnet): "Nihil....
videtur ·inconveniens sequi, si ab uno agente multa perficiantur, quemadmodum ab uno sole
perficiuntur omnes potentiae visivae animalium ad videndum " .
·
51
Summa Th., I; q. 79, art. 4, corpus et ad tum.
59
I. e., in that Plato posited no abstraction, but itctuation by the Forms. Even St. Afbert
seems to have interpreted Aristotle after such a "Platonic" fashion: In his commentary on
the Metaphysics, Albert characterizes God and the separate substances as diffusive " light "
which activdy creates all things by its very diffusion. Although positing an individual agent
intellect for each man, Albert nevertheless declared that the light of this agent intellect was
insufficient to induce knowledge, without some supervening superabundant light ( cf, GILSON,
op. cit., p. 671); and, in differentiating human knowledge from the knowledge had by separate substances, he characterizes the former as· essentially passive: " Nos, in theoria existentes, non facimus thcoremata, sed potius faciunt nos (cf. In XI Metaph., Tract. II, Ch.
IlII) ". The "separated intellects", in such a system, seem to be like the separated Forms
of Plato, which alone are actual, and -which themselves effectuate all actual knowledge in
inferior creatures.
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consider th~ sepiuate possible intellect as a principal mover, and all men as
subsidiary instruments: for the distribution of, and differentiation of, and
personal responsibility for, all human actions, would still have to be _referred
to the principal agent, i.e., the separate possible intellect. 60
·
. ·
.
In a word, the hypothesis of a separate possible intellect would wrest from
man every remnant of free will, and responsibility, and individual autonomy
- and must be eschewed on these grounds.
After all is said and done, though, we might pose the question: Is Averroes'
"material intellect" really the same as the "possible intellect" of Thomistic
terminology? Would such a material intellect really have any separate immanent
activity different from .the immovable intelligere actu of the separate agent
intellect? In other words, does Averroes allow any kind of transition from
potency to act other than purely material transitions, or motions?
He does allow some transitions from potency to act which are not · from
contrary to contrary, but are, as Aristotle puts it, " in the direction· of fixity
or nature". 61 Such a transition would be, for example, the transition from
boyhood to manhood. 62 However, it is significant that when he comes to
comment on Aristotle's statement 63 that universals are in a sense in the soul,
and that a man can exercise them at will - he gives an entirely different interpretation to these words than does St. Thomas : For St. Thomas, the "first
act." · which is here developed in the direction of fixity or nature, is the
natura communis, an intelligible essence which is still potential to receiving th~
intention of universality. 64 For Averroes, on the other hand; the first act which
.is educed to the ultimate act of universal predication, is merely the intentio
imaginabilis, the phantasm of the imagination, the " secondo subject " of the
separated intellect, - an intrinsecally material and transitory- subject. 65
Such a transition as Averroes presents, although it is higher that the mere
motion from contrary to contrary, _and no. doubt also of a higher type than
the semi-spontaneous activities of brute animals - is nevertheless not an autonomous, separate immanent activity. It rises above the forces of the material
components of that in which it is found - as forms and habits often do. 66 But
it does not rise so far above these latter as to be separate and independent.
For St. Thomas, on the other hand, such a transition is not just a relatively
high type of spontaneity, but an activity which begins and ends in the mind,
and does not depend on phantasms except per accidens, i.e., quoad objectum.
As we mentioned above, 67 the question as . to whether there can be any
potentiality which is not essentially dependent on matter, seems to be the
key to the differing interpretations of Aristotle's distinction between the active
and passive aspects of the intelligence. 68 For St. Thomas, there is some pas60

For the above argument.s, cf. De Unitate lntellectus, Ch.'s V, VI (Mandonnet Ed.,

pp. 53-59).
61
62
63
64

65
66

67
61

Cf. De Anima, H, 5, 417 b, 16.
Cf. AVEIUlOES, In II De Anima, n . 61..
De Anima, II, 5, 417 b, 22-25.
ST. THOMAS, In II De Anima, Leet. XH, n. 375-380.
Cf. AVEIUlOES, In II' De Anima, Sect. 60, 17-38.
Cf. ST. THOMAS, De Unitate lntellectus, p. 316, Cb. .JI (Mandonnct, p . 41).
Cf. n. 30.
Cf. ARISTOTLE, De Anima, ,III, 5, 430 a, 14 (Loeb. Ed.).
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sivity or. potentiility 69 . in the soul which is completely immune from the corruptive contrarieties of matter, and which can be developed in only one direction
· - towards perfection, i.e., an immaterial perfection. For Averroes, however,
all the passivity of the material intellect seems to be ari essentially " corrup. tive " passivity; it is identified with the imaginative and cogitative powers of
the sensitive soul of man, 70 and passes along in perpetual fluxation throughout
the eternal generations of men, perishing in an individual man at his death,
being renewed and cc continued on .,, with the birth of thought in other individual men.
The fact that St. Tho~as interprets the nature of the intellect in a different
way than does Averroes, seems to hinge on two considerations: a) That the
human soul is the form of the body; and b) that the human mind has operations
which are per se independent of the body. In the sections that follow, we
will consider the impact tha~ these considerations have had on Thomas' doctrine
on the intellect; and then show how he solves the problem of " the one and
the many" - as applied to the intellect.
a)

The human soul as form of the body.

· The intellective soul, · although coming to man, according to Aristotle,
"from without" (de foris), 71 is still educed from the potency of the matter,
in so far as the matter preexists the form of the intellective soul; and the
intell~tive soul is still the principle per prius of all the living operations of
this composite man, with this particular body. 72 Like every other soul, it is
the " first act of a natural organic bodv ", and carries out this common
"function" of soul just as a circle, triangle, and pentagon all conform to the
general definition of cc figure" '. 73 Although there is a problem as ·t o whether
the vegetative and ·sensitive parts · of the soul have a different origin than the
intellective part, 74 still, once the intellective soul has been coadapted to the
human composite, it proceeds to " contain ", in that . individual man, all the
inferior types of soul which are in man; just as a tetragonon, being a more
.advanced type of figure, contains virtually within it also the triangle. 75 The
mind, as the principal part or potency of the intellcctive soul, is " that whereby
the soul thinks and judges " ; 76 it is not an extrinsic, active principle which
does ·the thinking and judging for the soul, but rather an intrinsic power,
C()nsequent upon the very .nature of the human soul, to which ~11 its operation~

69
I am following tlhe Loeb translation quoted above. The " passive aspects " of the
soul should not be confused with the " passive intellect " - which, as we ~hall see, has a
more restricted meaning than the former term. (Some of the passivity of the soul is imma- .
terial potentiality).
,,
70
AVEllOES, In III De Anima, 5, 20; 182-188.
71
ST. THOMAS, De Unitate Inteltectur, p. 319, Gh. III (p. 46, Mandonnet).
12
Ibid., Ch. II, p. 313 (p. 38, Mandonnet).
73
Ibid., (37, MandQnnct).
74
ST. THOMAS, De Unitate Intellectur, Ch. III, pp. 319, 320.
75
Ibid., p. 320.
.
76
AllsTOTLE, De Anima, III, 429 a, 23 (quoted by THOMAS, in III De Anima, 4, Leet.
VlI, n. 690).
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are ultimately to be credit~. 77 This mind, before it thinks, is not actually
any of the things that it comes to know; 71 • but it is c, in potency " to becoming . all things. It is an artifact of infinite potentiality, so to speak, in that
it _
can become all things by an intentional union. However, it is not just· the
artifact, but also its own artificer. It can become all things precisely because
it _can make itself into all things, in this intentional way 79•
The intellective soul, then, qua intellective, has a dual aspect: In so far as
it is passive to the receptio~ of purely intentional perfections ad infinitum, i.e.
in so far as it is potential to all things, it is mind-in-po~ency, or the possible
intellect. 80 In so far as it can " make" all things out of its own resources, it
must already have the ultimate formality ot light through which phantasms are
rendered actually intelligible; i.e., it must be actual in some way; and this
aspect of the soul is the mind-in-act, or the agent intellect. 81
The human soul, then, as the form of the human body, is, in Thomas' formulation, a self-contained unity, which includes within its scope all . the· vegetative and sensitive functions of man in a pre-eminent way; and also, in the
most proper w,ay, as the immediate consequence of hs own specific formality,
the functions of the agent and possible intellect. The agent intellect is ari
active potency of the soul, along with the vegetative powers. 82 The possible
intellect is a quasi-passive potency of the soul. 83 Both agent · and possible
intellects are separable, impassible, and unmixed. They differ from each other
in that the agent intellect is in act, ,according to its ,substance; while the . possible intellect is in act only according to the impressed species possessed, but
in potency according to its " substance" - i.e., it is still in potency in so far
as it is the sub;ect of these intelligible species, and also in so £ar as it is capable
of receiving still further " impressions " of _intelligible species. 84
.
b) The autonomy ·of the human mind.

Aristotle, unlike Plato, did not base the actuality of thought upon any
separate and completely actual corresponding Ideas existing in the supernal
regions. In Aristotle's universe, as also in Plato's, actuality must be prior in
THOMAS, In III De Anima, 4, 'Leet. Vil!, n. 689 fl.
Ibid. (cf. ARISTOTLE, De Anima, III, 5, 430 a, 15).
" Ibid., III, ,, Leet. X, n. 735.
• In III De Anima, 5, Leet. X; n. 728.
II Ibid.
12
ST. THOMAS, De viTtute in communi, I, Art. I, corpus.
.
SJ I say" quasi passive", because strictly speaking only the ~nse powers are truly passive
potencies, i.e., dependent per se on external agents· (sensible objects for actuation).
·
14
Cf. ST. THOMAS, In III De Anima, 5, Leet. X, n. 732. The other aspect or facet of
intcllect, which is completely in potency, completely ipassive and transitory, - what St. Tho11111 calls the "passive intdlect ", - .is described in the following manner:
Haec pars animac dicitur intcllectus, sicut et dicitur rationalis, inquantum aliqualiter
. panicipat rationem, obendiendo rationi, et sequendo motum ejus. (Loe. cit., n. 745).
As may be seen, this "passive intellect" is not "intellect" in_a univocal sense: rather,
h is the complex of inferior operations in the soul, c. g., the imagination. and the memory,
which in so far as they participate in a more or less proximate way in the operations of
intelligence, appear in a phenomenal and ephemeral fashion to be themselves " intelligent
Cll)a'ations ".
77

71
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the whole scheme of things. 85 But he differed from Plato in refusing to make
the gratuitous assumption of sepa11ate Ideas, or intelligible Forms, as a prior
actuality which by participation or diffusion could be reactivated in man's mind,
through " retµembrance· ''. Rather, he chose to take -a · more empirical, scientifical approach, and let the facts speak for themselves. And what are the
facts: They are simply as follows: The. human being approaches the , raw
material of' sensible objects; unifies his sensations into the concrete ·actuality of
single impressions, or . phantasms; and then, from these latter, abstracts what .
was previously actually perceptible but only potentially intelligible, and makes
this actually intelligible. The mind grapples with the intelligible species which
are potential in things,·· and makes theni actual by abstracting them, by separating them both from matter, and from material conditions. The mind itself,
then, must in some way give actuality ·to thought; - It was such considerations
as these, says St. Thomas, 86 that prompted Aristotle to posit; instead of separate
Platonic Forms, a separate and actual " agent,, intellect:
·
Since Aristotle taught that the intelligible essences of sensible things are in
matter, but are not intelligible actu, it was necessary that he should point out the 1ntellective principle which could abstract these essences, and thus render them intelligible actu. 81
·
.

.

Ancl' so, instead of separate and actual Platonic Forms mysteriously causing
th6ugljt' in man, w'e have a separate and actual agent intellect, and a separate
and actualized possible intellect. But how separate? And how actual, or
actualized?
.
Both possible and agent intellect must be separate, St. Thomas tdls us, 88
since as Aristotle says, mind is potential to the intentional possession of all real
things, 89 and, unlike the faculty of sensations, is not dependent upon the
body. 90 The intellect is also separable in the most ultimate way, in that it is
perpetual, 91 and can perdure after the dissolution of the corporeal organs on
which it had depended per modum objecti. 92 WhiJe it is joined to a living
· human being, however, it is ·dependent per accidens on phantasms, as the materials with which it must ·work, if it is to be perfected in the natural manner;
it is like an ethereal body which is a naturally light, but which is prevented
from rising up higher, because of the temporal and material conditions in which
it is situated. 93
·
The intellect is not only naturally separate, but actual of its
nature.
· The · agent intellect, as actuating mind, is, says St. Thoma_s, ·a positive state, a

very

85
Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaph., XII, 6, 1072 a, 4 ff; also, De Anima, III, 7, 431 a, 1 ff.
" In III De Anima, 5, Leet. X, n. 731.
.
17
Ibid.: Quia Aristotcles ponit, quod quidditates rertllQ sensibilium sunt in materia,
ct non intclligibiles actu, .pportuit quod poncrct aliquem intellcctum qui abstrahcret a ma·
teria, ct sic f.aceret' cits intclligibiles actu.
·
·
11
In III De Anima, 5, Leet. X, n. 742; and 4, Leet. VII, n. 687-699. ·
• AlusTOTLE, De Anima, II.I, 4, 429 a, 23;
• Ibid., Ill, 4, 429 l?t. 4.
,. ST. THo:MAs, De unitate Intellectus, II, p. 313 (35, Mand).
2
'
Ibid., pp·. 317, 318, Oi. III (42, 43, Mand.).
93
Ibid., pp. 318, 319 (45, Mand).
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habit of the soul; 94 it is; indeed, the very actuality of that knowledge which
must be presupposed for any progression in knowledge:
. · . That · which is in potency, can only be reduced to act by that which already is
in act. And so a person who has knowledge in _p otency does .not come into the possession of actual knowledge, by experiment or thrpugh teaching - except by dint of
· that actual knowledge which must already be present in the mind: and the reason
for this is that any teaching or. learning which takes place in or through the mind,
presupposes some previous cognition, as (Aristotle) says, in Bk. 1 of the Posterior
Analytics. 95

The " agency" of the intellect creates the store of " actual knowledge"
which the human soul possesses, and causes this store to be expanded, as it
were, indefinitely, through the medium of whatever phantasms are present to
the mind and properly disposed to allow intellection. This " actual knowledge "
is not the impressed species, which is not yet activated. It is rather the first
principles, the primary habitual knowledge possessed by the human soul as a
result of its very creation by God. 96 And the possible intellect is the eternal
receptacle, so to speak, of the actual knowledge. From the very moment that
the human soul informs the individual human body, it begins to tend towards
expressing, in mature thought, the actuality which it already possesses. It
attains to this end naturally and inexorably, as soon as the dispositions of the
body permit. 97 It must even be presupposed that, as the first act, to which
all the operations . of the body are teleologically ordered,98 it tends to cause
obstacles to · be removed and maturity to be attained, so that the full activity
of thought may take place without hindrance.
The individual human intellect is then, according to St. Thomas, separate
from, intrinsically immune from, matter; .and is . a subsistent spiritual substance in its own right. For its full perfection and entitative completion, it
needs material adjuncts; but it can "live without these", so to speak. This
separate subsistence of the soul is no{, however, a subsistence in word alone.
The soul is not like a man on a mountain top who says he is completely selfsufficient, but must still look outside himself for his food supply. No, the
soul has all the equippage of self-subsistence intrins_ically, of its very nature.

94

In III De Anima, Leet. X, 728, 729.
" In III De Anima, Leet. X, n. 740: Quod in. potentia est, non reducitur in actum
nisi per aliquod quod est actu. Et sic etiam de potentia sciente, non fit aliquis sciens actu,
invcniendo, ncque · di1ccndo, nisi per aliquam scicntiam ,praccxistentem m actu; quia omnis
doctrina et disdplina intellective fit ex praeexistenti cognitione, ut dicitur in primo P.osteriorum.
96
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 79, art. 4, c.; also De Unitate Int ., Ch. VII, p. 333. This
is not to identify the agent intellect wiili the seH-cvident first principles; but only to specify
it .as the- habit, i.e., the actuality or "light" of the first principles.
,., In VII Phys., Leet. VI; "intellectus...·. possibilis secundum se consideratus, semper est
in ultima dispositione ad recipiendam speciem intclligibilcm. Si ergo non sit impedimentum,
statim ad praesentiam objectorum, per experimentum acceptorum, advcnit ei species intclligibilis, sicut speculo forma specularis ad praesentiam corporis.... Si vcro sit impedimentum,
sic:ut juvenibus accidit, oportet hujusmodi impedimenta auferri ad hoc quod species intelligibilis in intellectu recipiatur.... ".
91
De Anima, II, 4, 415 b, 15-18.
·
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Once. created, it ·actualizes itself, vivifies 99 itself. Whether it be detained at
the core of the universe, or transported to the heights of the" celestial spheres",
it has one thing that cannot be taken away from it; namdy, thought-energy,

17 J'OV blQyeUl.
Having considered St. Thomas' premises of the complete autonomy and selfsufficiency of the human intellect~ as an essential and intrinsic power of the
individual intellective soul - we may now proceed to examine his conclusions
as to just how the intellect is one, and just how it is individual.
c) St. Thomas' ·solution: '' Pluralitas intellectuum, unitas intellecti ".

Averroes, the " perverter of the text" of Aristotle, attained something of
a noble purpose in ascribing all the diverse thoughts and ideas of men to a
separate, independent intellect. By this means he supplied a doctrinal foundation for the unity which is found in the universal ideas of men, for the communication which is possible among them; But he does not solve the problem
in doing this, says St. Thomas. 100 Rather, he creates new and insuperable
problems:
1) According to the doctrine of Averroes, change, and the transient perfectibility of· thought, accrue only to the imaginations of men. The separate
possible intellect would have to have, in habit, and in itself, the totality
of all diverse thoughts, before · it could communicate these latter by " continuation" with men's imaginations. 'Therefore no individual man could "discover" for himself anything which the (i.e., his) possible intellect did not
already know. " Discovery " would be just a word.
·
2) Neither could a man " learn " anything from a teacher. ·For he and his
teacher would share the same possible intellect. And if the one possessed the
knowledge to be communicated, the other must necessarily .also possess the same
knowledge before it is communicated.
3) The single possible intellect could not be " dependent " on the phantasms of individual men, for some kind of purely extrinsic perfectibility or
·progression. For, according to Aristotle's theory, men have always existed; i.e.,
there never was a first man. Therefore, there could never have been a first
thought. And if there were no first thought, there could be none now.
Also, to even talk about " continu·a tion " of the possible intellect with
the phantasms of men is absurd. For the intelligible species · of this possible
intellect would be, by definition, abstracted from phantasms, i. e., completely
separate from ·t he latter. And it makes no sense to speak of .the continuation
of two things, one of which has it as an essential characteristic to be separate
from the other.
4) Nor could the possible intellect merely sup,f;rimpress its intelligible ·
species on the phantasms, · and illustrate them in this way. For the intel99

I.e., in the intellective sense; cf. Metaph., XII, 7, 1072 b, 26:
, "The actuality of thought is life ".
, ·
100
For the following, cf. De Unitate Intellectus, p. 328 ff; (60-62, Mand) and In III De
Anima, Leet. VII, n. 689 ff.
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ligible content of such phantasms · would still only be potentially intelligible.
It _would have to be actually abstracted, to be made actually intelligible. Such
a '.' superimpression " would amount to nothing more than juxtaposition of
phantasm and concept. Human thought would not ensue.
. ·
5) If in ,any way our phantasms were activated and · illustrated by some
extrinsic intellect, this would indeed cause us, and our phantasms, to be
understood; but in no wise would it make us understanding.
6) I.f, finally, in lieu of any continuation -with, or super-impression on,
the phantasms of men, the separate possible intellect were completely disparate - somehow causing thought at a distance - this would involve us in
even worse difficulties than before: For the -first prerequisites, indispensible
for any individual ,acts of intellection, are a) a medium:, through which thought
can take place; and b) a proportion between the mind and the instruments
of the mind.
·
- Granted, then, that the intellect is not a separate substance s·undered
in its entity from the souls. of men, and that thought must be an activity
somehow intrinsic to each individual intellective soul - how do we explain
those passages in Aristotle where he indicates that thought-activities should
not be attributed to the soul ·itself, but rather to the composite? For instance,
in I De Anima, 4, 408 b, 13, he says that "it is doubtless better to avoid saying
that the soul pities or learns or t_hinks, and rather to say that it is the man
who does this with his soul". And in the same place, 408 b, 25, he adds that"thinking, loving, and hating are affections not of mind, but of that which has
mind, so far as it has it ".
In commenting on both of these passages, 101 St. Thomas says that Aristotles
is not restricting the essential operations of mind to that which takes place in
the corporeal organs; but rather "supponendo loquitur ", i.e., is merely repeating the opinion of the ancient _philosophers, who could conceive of the
operations of the mind only in terms of the various observable phenomena
to be found in the " passive intellect ": Averroes, on the· other hand, does
not add any such qualifications, but rather presents this as Aristotle's own
opinion. 102
It is significant, I think, that Averroes does not find anything strange in
such passages, anything which would appear to be at variance with the whole
corpus of Aristotelian doctrine. For Averroes was himself of the same materialistic bent as the ancient naturalists whose doctrine Aristotle sifts in the
first book of the De Anima. For Averroes himself, the natural world is syno101
Cf. ST. THOMAS, In I De Anima, Leet. X, n, 151-152, and. n. 165. - N. B. In the
last-mentioned paragraph, St. Thomas paraphrases Aristotle as saying "hujusmodi operationes,
quae sunt intelligere, amare, et odire, sunt passiones 'illius ', scilicet animae (supponendo
~tur), 'sed hujus habentis' ". This passage makes no sense, in the context, as it stands.
It would seem that a " non " shoukl be inserted between " odire " and " sunt " . This is
'ftrified by the fact that a " non " docs appear in the versio antiqua of Aristotle, which is
· being paraphrased here.
•
m Cf. AVEUOES, In I De Anima, n. 64, lines 10-27, and n. 66, lines 37-47. The passages
!D question would be, at face value, in consonance with our ordinary human parlance, but,
ID the whole context of Aristotle's doctrine, would seem to demand some quelification or
ezplanation - ~pecially in view of tbe doctrine which Aristotle propounds in III De
Anima, 5.
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·nymo~s with the material world. And so it is natural that, in other passages,
where Aristotle speaks ·o f a separate intellect or eternal life; Averroes should
forthwith relegate such thought. and such life to a sphere above the natural
world, to the sphere of the separated intelligences. 1n· this way, his own natural world is left intact. Human thought is just another material transition.
If there is any eternal immanent activity, this must be attributed only to
God and the separate intelligences, moving the world from without, unmoved
themselves, never coming into contact with the world- because contact implies .
motion.
In trying to corroborate these opinions, · Averroes reveals the incongruity
of his position. The gratuitous hypothesis of a separated possible intellect,
far from explaining the phenomenon of human cognition, makes it almost completely unintelligible. It is a step backward. It is a reversion to · the -view
of Anaxagoras, who posited a separate and impassible intellect, but . still left
the problem of knowledge unsolved. 103
Aristotle himself went beyond the materialists whom he synthesizes in the
De Anima. He fully recognized that there is the spark of the divine in material
form themselves. 104 The divine spark in man is the intellect - both possible
and agent - which alone in the physical world is capable of a separate and
perpetual existence, simply because it alone truly subsists immovably in itself,
" vere est ". 105
The intellect, then, is neither a logical genus, nor a separate Platonic Form,
nor a separate substance. It is a real " instrument of instruments " existing in
individual men. There are as many intellects as there are men.
Nor docs any contradiction to this arise from the ·fact that the intellective
soul is immaterial, i. e., essentially independent from matter in its operation
and esse. True, matter is the ordinary cause of the individuation and multiplication of things in the physical world. However, there is no more of a
contradiction ·involved in the multiplication of separate and immaterial sub.stances on the basis of material generation, says St. Thomas, than there is in
the fact that a body whi~h 'is naturally heavy is, because of contingent circumstances, temporarily on top of that which is naturally light. 106
But if the intellect is thus individuated, if there are as many intellective
principles as there are men, how do we explain the apparent unity of our
understanding - the fact that we seem to share the sa-me universal ideas, and
to communicate our own ideas in soine way to others? Must not there be
· some kind of transcendent unity of the intellect, to explain the agreement, and
communication, which obtains among thinking men?
·
The unity we ·must look for is, says St. Thomas, not a .unity of some all-

,,
103

Cf. ST. THOMAS, In I De Anima, ,Leet. V, n. '57, 66.
104
Cf. ARISTOTLE, De Anima, II, 4, 415 a, 26 ff; also, Physics, I, 192 _a, 17 ff.
105
a.
ST. THOMAS, In III De Anima, Leet. X, n. 742, 743.
106
Cf. ST. THOMAS, De Unitate Intellectus, p. 331 (63-64. Mandonnet), Ch. VIL This
should not be taken as implying that. the multiplication of intellects is just a temporary and;
as it were, unnatural state, like the devated position of a naturally heavy body; but rather,
as a mere illustration to show that .rhere is no more contradiction involved in the one case,
than there is in the other.
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embracing intellect, but a ~nity of the intellected, of the understood thing. To
account for the unity of understanding among men,
we- munst simply concede that the understanding of some particular thing, for ex~mple
an individual rock, can only be one, not only for all men, but also·.in regard to all
intellects. t<Y7
·

And so the unity of the understanding of men, even in regard to "separable" objects (e.g. mathematical notions), does not prove that there is one
· separate intellect with its own separate species intelligibilis. Rather, it is explained by the fact that different intellects, by means of different intelligible ·species,
can ·all focus on the same potentially intelligible object:
The object which is understood by me and by you is one and the same thing;
but it is understood in one way by me, and in another way by ·you - that is, by a
different .intelligible·species in each case; and my act of understanding is different from
your act of understanding; and my intellect is different from your intellect. 108

The question of " the one and the many ", therefore, . as applied to the
u'.nderstanding, seems to be resolved by a consideration of the nature of the
intelligible species. The intelligible species is not the object of knowledge,
but only the means of knowing; . it is a certain spiritual representation or similitude, in the soul, of ·the objects of knowledge. And so, in the event that
there are many intellects, all having their own diverse intellectual representations of the same identical object - the concepts formed in such an event are
in a way the same, in a way different. They are the same, in that they are all
referred outside themselves to one and the same focal point, so to speak. They
are different, in that the species and . the in_tellect, in each case, share in the
different entitative characteristics of the individual intellective soul in which
they happen to inhere.
.
In the case given above, the process of cognition begins with one type
of unity, and ends with another: The natura communis, before it is abstracted
from objects, is one in its origin; and potentially one in its universal predicability, but is actually multiplied through the phys~cal principles of matter,
form and pdvation. After it is abstracted, and receives the intention of universality, it takes on a new type of unity, a unity which transcends the
constrictions of the principles of nature; i.e., the very unity of the " separate "
possible intellect which it infqrms. The unity of the universal, as such, -exists
only in the individual intellective soul: .
A single natura communis -is only predicated of many, according as it is conce~ved
beyond those principles by which " the one" is divided into "the many": and from

07

Ibid., Oi. VII, p. 332 (60 f, Mandonnet): « Est.... simpliciter concedendum quod
intellectum unius rei, puta lapidis, est unum tantum, non solum in omnibus hominibus sed
etiam in omnibus intellectibus ".
'°' De Unitate Intellectus, Ch. VII, p. 333 (65, Mandonnet): "Est.... unum quod intelligitur a me et a te; sed alio intelligitur ,a me, et alio a te, id est, alia specie intelligibili; et
aliud est intelligere meum, et aliud tuum; et alius est intelligere meus, et alius tuus ".
'
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this if follows that universals, qua universals; do not have any existence except in the
soul. 109

The new unity which is cc lent,, to the natura communis does not, however,
imply the unity of the activated species, nor of the subjective intellects receiving these latter. If it implies any supreme unity beyond the unity of the ma:..
terial object and the individual unity of the one receiving the species - it would
imply the unity of the first " illustrator " or " teacher" - or, in Avicenna's
terminology, the cc last intellect" - i.e., God. 110 Just as the individual acti~
vation and common perceptions of the visual potencies of animals, is due to
the universal illumination of the sun: so also, the multiplication of coinmon
intelligible species among men, must be referred to God, the First Source of
all intellective illumination. The very fact that there are many lumina implies
that there is some single lux as the cause of these. Men, therefore, do not
share one common intellect; but they do share one common Teacher;
But isn't this just a play on words? If all actual knowledge exists in God's
intellect, and i£ He shares this knowledge with us, "passing it on" to us,
cc teaching " us -in some interior way is this not, in effect to share His intellect with us? Do we not, in our thought-activity, participate in the intelligere
of God, and thus also in His intellect? This would not follow, according to
the principles. propounded by Aquinas. For " teaching ", according to him, is
not a process by which knowledge is transferred through media of varying tractibility from one intellect to another. Rather, it is much like the process of
healing, in which the physician merely « helps nature along • to effect the cure
of the patient:
·
.
It is not required that the knowledge which is in the learner should be caused
by the knowledge which is in his teacher, in the way that the heat in water is transferred, for instance, from the heat.in a flame; irather, it is caused in much the same
manner as t~ health in a material subject is caused by the health which is in the
soul of the physician. For, just as there exists in the sick patient the physical principle
of health, to which the physician merely administers reinforcements, for the practical
attainment of health: so also, in the learner, there is a natural principle of knowledge
- that is to say, the agent intellect, along with the fust principles per se nota. All the
teacher cloes is supply certain aids, in order to deduce the consequences from these
self-evident principles .. :. 111
·

God, then, as the universal Teacher of mankind, does not,. at least in the
natural order, share His intellect or his intelligere with in~ividual men, in order
10t Sr. THOMAS, In II De Anima, Leet. XII, n. 380:
"Natura commun1s solum est
unum de multis, prout intclligitur practcr principia, quibus unum in multa dividitur: unde
relinquitur, quod universalia, secundum quod sunt universalta, non sunt nisi in anin;ia ". ·
110
De Unitate Intellectus, Ch. VII, p. 334 (68, Mandon'net).
111
De Unitate Intellectus, VII, p. 333 (66, Mandonnct): "Nee oportet qu<;xl scientia
quac est in discipulo, causetur a scicntia quae est in magistro, sicut calor aquac a calore
ignis, scd sicut sanitas quae est in matcria, a sanitate quae est in anima medici. Sicut enim
in infumo est pr.incipium naturale sanitatis, qui medicus auxilia subministrat ad sanitatem
perficiendam; ita in discipulo est prindpium naturale scientiac, scilicet intellectus ,agcns, et
prima principia per se nota. Doctor aQtem subministrat quaedam adminicula, deduccndo consequens ex principiis per se notis .... ".
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to actuate thought in th~m. He merely "supplies certain aids". What are
these aids? He certainly does not, in the natural order, stimulate thought in
men by the use of words, and other conventional signs; nor does He do so by
the direct production of sensible images in the imagination, as .do the angels. 112
·For such . actions as these imply motion, and God does n.o t act by any motion;
as do natural agents, 113 rather, God acts ppon. creatures " by the very fact that
·He gives esse, without any motion being involved in the communication of
this esse ". 114 Speci:fically, as applied to the human intellect, God causes thought
by giving it an immaterial esse (since immateriality is the cause of the power
of intellection); and by being Himself the first, and the most intelligible, being,
and thus causing the secondary and depencknt intelligibility of the impressed
species. 115
A man, therefore, can have many teachers, including God Himself. But the
universal species informing his possible intellect, are not the same species that
inform the intellects of any of his teachers. The species in each man's mind
share in the individuality and incommunicability of his own unique subsistent
form. The thoughts actually existing in the multitudes of intellectual creatures
are one only in one sense: namely, in that they have as their single source the
. intelligible exemplars of things existing in the mind of God. 116 They are
" derived " from these exemplars as rivulets flow from their headwaters. But
the rivulets are not "in " the headwaters, except metaphorically, and the
thoughts of men do not proceed from any single separated intellect, except in the ·
very limited and qualified sense that we have mentioned.
· · Aristotle, however, did not make fully explicit the doctrine of the autonomy of the individual intellect, and of its survival in the afterlife - perhaps
for the same reason that he expressed doubt in XII Metaphysics, as to whether
the number of separated substances had· been correctly calculated according to
the number of the celestial spheres. For in the latter case, he knew that separate
-substances could not be essentially ordained to move bodies; since nothing is
ordered to an end which is inferior to itself. 117 So also, in the former case, he
must have realized that the intellective soul had some higher end awaiting it
than a temporal and material existence; but he couched his doctrine on personal
immortality in very general terms, since he did not know the nature of that
" higher end ".
.
And thus there is little doubt hut that St. Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle was influenced by his Faith, i.e., by the revelation of that " higher end ".
For if a belief in "personal immortality" ~as not involved here, Ayerroes'
interpretation of Aristotle's ambiguous ref~rences to survival of an individual
intellect would be less reprehensible.

112
Cf. ST. THOMAS, Summa Th., .J, q. 111, art. 1, c.
m Cf. In I Sent., Dist. XLII, q. 1, art. 1.
114
Ibid., ad 3um: " .... in co quod da( esse non per motum " .
11 5
ST. THOMAS, Summa Th., I, q. 105, art. 3, c. ct ad ium.
116
117

Summa Th., I, q. 105, 3, c.
Cf. De Unitate Intellectus, Ch. VII, p. 3.33.
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5. ST.

·THOMAS'

Sou.JTION,

RE-VISITED.

Averroes might be called a " . passivist ", in regard to his theory of human
intellection. By this I mean that, for Averroes, the process of intellection seems
to be a " passion ", in the strict sense of the word. It is not perfective of the
individual man in whom it takes place. Rather, it ends, it is corrupted, at
the death of the individual man. In the human race as a whole, it might be
said to be a permanent and perduring perfection; but only in the sense that
the generations of men are (according to the hypothesis of Aristotle) eternal.
St. Thomas, on the other hand, might be called an " individuist " - if we
prescind from the conno·t ation of excessive subjectivity or individualism which
is associated with that word. He defended the autonomy and self-sufficiency of
the human intellect, in its own order; that is, with due regard for the dependence of all creatures on God. For only God is unequivocally autonomous. The
autonomy which man possesses is possessed in an analogous way - as ·are also
his esse, his freedom, and his intelligere~ But if we concentrate, not on the
way in which man's autonomy of thought differs from God's but on the way
in which it is similar, we find that there is one pronounced similarity: man
can "make" his own thought. Given the appropriate raw materials, man has
in his own nature all the necessary equippage, all the requisite tools, for building
the edifices of thought.
Granted that man's thought is invested with the attributes of autonomy
and spontaneity, the community of men seems to be most similar to that group
of artists gathered together in a studio: the gathering that we mentioned in
the Introduction as exemplifying the view of human thought processes as something individual and independent. For, just as these artists create reproductions of the same model according to their varying perspectives; . so also, in
Thomas' formulation, men fashion their own actually intelligible species of
the same identical potentially intelligi~le nature, according to the entitative
characteristics of their own. soul. And souls do differ. 118
But does St. Thomas, in reacting against Averroes, avoid the egocentric
dilemma?
" Objectivity " in the Thomistic context derives from an external referrent,
the single object or aspect of objects which many focus upon. This provides
the criterion for truth; namely, the fact that in cases of doubt we can always
return to some one object or objective ·aspect to provide publicly accessible verifiability. But these publicly accessible "objects" include colors and sounds,
political and cultural "facts ", aesthetic and moral qualities - all of which,
it must be admitted, are to a great extent subjectively induc~. It would be
difficult to find a purely objective fact or event undistorted by prior subjective
experience or cultural background or the eccentricities of one's native language.
" A rose is a rose " only in logic books. Granted ~at objectivity exists, is it
wise to hypothesize that it is something external to the mind, separated from
subjective distorsions at some arbitrary point, e.g. the tips of the fingers? If
everything "objective" seems to be laden with subjective aspects, perhaps it
would be reasonable to conclude that man's inner subjectivity is equally en111

Cf. .AtusTOTLE, De Anima, I, 3; 407 b, 20 ff.
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dowed with objectivity. If various individual minds are drawn to focus upon
something " objective ", does the attractive power come only from the extemal
referrent, or is there also some internal impetus drawing the mind towards
objectivity? If the latter is the case, then it would seem that the orientation
to objectivity is rooted in an internal impulse or drive - so that, in a certain
sense, objectivity derives from subjectivity ·and is immanent within subjectivity
(as Kant indicated).
Then again, to return · to the theme of communicability, which was intro. duced earlier in this paper: Are there any internal grounds for the possibility
of communication, when each man possesses a set of ideas that arc distinctivdy
his own? The possibility for communication in St. Thomas' epistemology is
grounded in the fact that each individual can compare his representations of
an external referrent with the representations of others, to ." fill in the iaps"
that may exist in his own perspective. But how could men compare their
insights with one · another, ·unless they trusted in a certain similarity of all
ideas - which similarity would give rise to the possibility of "sharing" and
comparing thoughts. There can be no differences without pre-existing similarities.
Are we to suppose that the differences in your idea of a rock and my idea of
that rock are all internal or immanent; while the sim ilarities are only to be
found by reference to the external wodd, to the object signified or intended?
Perhaps one way to avoid the. egoncentric dilemma completely would be to
presuppose that, in a certain sense, all men are either actually or implicitly
part of a massive super-mind or a " communal consciousness ", to use the
Teilhardian term. This would elucidate, a) objectivity and b) communicability,
insofar as a) the possibility of objective truth would derive partially from th~
fact that we all possess the same common mind; and b) the possibility for communication would derive from the fact that our common mind would possess
certain common ideas shared by ,all of us. ·
Would such an hypothesis destroy the grounds for individual freedom by
submerging the individual in some Absolute Ego (as e.g. Fichte and Schelling
attempted to do, and as Hegel was accused of doing)? 119 Or is it perhaps possible to salvage the autonomy of individual intelligence, within the compass of
a supra-individual mind? If so, th,i~ would not only accentuate .the significance
(in the history of philosophy) of such people as Teilhard de Chardin and (in
his own way) Averroes, but also give
firmer philosophical basis to the
Christian doctrine of the mystical body. 120
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Hegel's "absolute Spirit", which is widely misunderstood, is not an " absolute ego",
but is rather transcendent unity-in-difference of universal Spirit with particular · spirits - a
llllity which gives rise to individual men free and independent in their sphere of existence.
Cf. Phanomenologie des Geistes, IV, S. 140 (Meiner ed. ): "Was fiir das Bewusstein weiter
wird, ist die Erfahrung, was der Geist ist, dtcsc absolute Substanz, wc1chc .... die Einhcit
dcrsclben ist: Ich, das Wir, und Wir, das lch ist ".
120
Which, as commonly interpreted, seems to imply that, at least in some ideal state
of Omstianity, individual minds will function as a single intelligent super-personality without
losing their individuating characteristics. And thus the " afterlife " instead of connoting a
loosely.knit supernatural organization of individual spirits, would connote a new kiod ·o f
°'lfl1lism.
12. - Divus Thomas.

